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By midday on July 1st, 1863, what had begun as a small skirmish in the farmland north
of Gettysburg had escalated into a full-blown conflict. Around noon on July 1st, the leading
division of the Union army’s Eleventh Corps, a predominantly German-American force
commanded by Oliver Howard, arrived at the field. Despite being exhausted from marching at a
double-quick pace to reach the battlefield, the men of the Eleventh Corps were assigned a critical
yet daunting task. In an effort to buy time for the rest of the Army of the Potomac to arrive and,
more importantly, to prevent Confederate forces from occupying the favorable defensive terrain
just south of Gettysburg, two divisions of the Eleventh corps were tasked with repulsing
Confederate assaults from the north, with a third division positioned directly south in support, on
Cemetery Hill. 1
The two divisions, commanded by Brigadier Generals Alexander Schimmelfennig and
Francis Barlow, positioned themselves in the farm valley to the north of town. With the majority
of the Army of the Potomac still several hours of marching away from combat, these two
divisions were the right flank of the Union defense. With the Union First Corps positioned just
due east along Oak Ridge and McPherson's Ridge, the Eleventh extended from the Mummasburg
Road for approximately three quarters of a mile northwest, its extreme right flank positioned just
west of Rock Creek and the Heidlersburg Road. 2
The landscape in the valley was less than ideal for a sustained defensive effort. It was
largely featureless, consisting of little more than a square mile of flat farmland with little to no
areas for troops to take cover. Frustrated by the disadvantageous terrain, Barlow advanced his
division, which stood as the right flank of the entire Union force, onto a small wooded knoll, the
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only position of measurable elevation in the valley. Despite attempting to justify the movement
by claiming that he could not let the Confederate attackers occupy the knoll for an artillery
position, Barlow’s decision to advance his troops further than orders stated proved to be a
significant strategic blunder. With the majority of his division several hundred yards ahead of the
rest of the Eleventh Corps’ line, Barlow’s position on the knoll created a salient in the Union line
that was vulnerable to attack from the north, east, and west.
By mid-afternoon, Confederate General Jubal Early had begun his assault on the right
flank of the Union line. Recognizing the vulnerability of the Barlow’s 900 troops positioned on
the knoll, Brigadier General John Gordon’s Georgian troops spilled across Rock Creek and
mercilessly assaulted the exposed right flank of Barlow’s division. Despite mounting a fierce
resistance against superior numbers, the men of the 54th and 68th New York were eventually
forced to flee their position. In just 20 minutes of fighting, the extreme right flank of the Union
line had dissolved and collapsed. With Gordon’s men now occupying Barlow’s Knoll to the east
and Early’s divisions still launching frontal assaults from the north, the remaining Union
defenders were now enduring Confederate assaults from two fronts. The collapse of the Barlow’s
Knoll position created a snowball effect that resulted in the Eleventh Corps defenses collapsing
from right to left, with survivors fleeing in confusion and terror southward through the town. By
4 o’clock in the afternoon, the Eleventh Corps’ lines had completely dissolved. The fighting had
been impressively lopsided: In little over an hour, the Eleventh Corps had suffered
approximately 3,200 casualties, including 1,400 prisoners. Confederate casualties amounted to
less than 750. 3
Despite the failure of the Eleventh Corps to repulse Early’s assault, the first day of
fighting at Gettysburg still ended on a somewhat positive note for Union command. Already held
3

Stephen W. Sears, Gettysburg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003), 212-7.

Klustner 4

and anchored by a third division of the Eleventh Corps, Cemetery Hill stood as the rallying point
for the surviving elements of the Eleventh fleeing from the valley below. Despite being criticized
for keeping the majority of his third division defending Cemetery Hill rather than engaging with
the enemy near Barlow’s Knoll, Howard recognized the strategic importance of occupying the
hill. Rising over 100 feet tall, it offered Union forces a fortified, elevated position with a
commanding view of the battlefield and a perfect location to place artillery batteries. With
Culp’s Hill rising to the northeast and Cemetery Ridge directly to the south, Cemetery Hill was
considered the “keystone” of the Union line: its occupation and defense was thus imperative to
maintaining a strong and uniform defensive position on the ridges and hills south of the town.
Lastly, Cemetery Hill shielded the Baltimore Pike just east of the hill. Keeping the Baltimore
Pike clear, secured, and in Union hands ensured that it would remain usable for the Army of the
Potomac’s extensive supply trains, as well as an emergency route out of the area if necessary.
While Jubal Early’s defeat of the Eleventh Corps was demoralizing and left many of its units as
shells of their former selves, the Army of Northern Virginia’s failure to continue their
momentum from its victories on the first day through overtaking Cemetery Hill ensured that the
Union forces at Gettysburg would continue to prevent Lee’s forces from occupying the high
ground south of the town that would prove to be essential for victory during the next two days. 4
When visiting Cemetery Hill and Barlow’s Knoll in the present day, there is very little
information presented by the National Park Service that sheds any light on the strategic
importance of the hill, the ill-advised advance of General Barlow, the bloodshed that occurred on
and around the hill, nor the impact that the Eleventh Corps’ retreat had on the widespread stigma
and prejudice surrounding German American soldiers in the Union army. The failure of the

4

Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: Culp’s Hill & Cemetery Hill (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1993), 25.

Klustner 5

National Park Service to fully acknowledge every narrative tied to this landscape inevitably
results in visitors misunderstanding not only the true story of the fighting that transpired, but also
its significance for the collective German-American identity in the United States.
One of the most obvious aspects of the interpretive landscape around Cemetery Hill is the
absence of nearly any commemoration of the Army of Northern Virginia’s role in the fighting.
While monuments dedicated to Union commanders and soldiers alike are numerous, there are
none respectively for their Confederate counterparts. By placing an overt emphasis on Union
monumentation, the Park Service is subsequently causing visitors to be oblivious of the lopsided
victory that the Confederates achieved on July 1st, and more importantly of the extensive human
suffering that occurred in the valley below.
The absence of Confederate commemoration anywhere around Cemetery Hill, as well as
the grandeur monuments commemorating Generals Howard and Hancock on the summit results
in the casual visitor interpreting the site as a symbol of Union military dominance and prestige.
The position did indeed hold a critically important role in Union strategy for the rest of the battle,
and Howard’s recognition of the hill’s importance should not go unnoticed. This, however is
only half the story. The National Park Service fails to mention anywhere on site Cemetery Hill’s
importance as a rallying point for the retreating men for the Eleventh Corps and ignores the
strategic misjudgement that led to these men fleeing up the slopes of the hill.
Another aspect of the Cemetery Hill landscape that skews the visitor’s interpretation of
the battle is the manner in which Francis Barlow is memorialized. The monument portrays
Barlow as a dashing, heroic figure who stands honorably towards an advancing enemy. Nowhere
does it mention Barlow’s catastrophic decision to advance his own division forward and creating
a salient in the Union line. Left only with this sole monument to interpret at the site of Barlow’s
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Knoll and no wayside in proximity, visitors are presented with only one side of Barlow’s story.
Similar to the grand monuments on the summit of Cemetery Hill, the presence of Barlow’s
monument, coupled with the absence of any other interpretive markers, allows visitors to ignore
the fact that Barlow’s strategic error arguably led to the success of the Confederate assaults on
the first day of combat. Again, no mention is ever made regarding the loss of life that was a
direct result of Barlow’s decision making, nor his anti-German prejudice that helped contribute
to the stigma surrounding the Eleventh Corps’ identity as a German-American unit.
Lastly, the National Park Service fails to present what the fighting on and around
Cemetery Hill meant for the thousands of German-Americans that were involved in the combat.
The stigma surrounding German-American soldiers in the Union army, especially after the
humiliating defeat at Chancellorsville is a theme that is often not realized by the casual visitor.
No monument stands in dedication to the hundreds of German-Americans who fell as casualties
on the first day of Gettysburg. By failing to acknowledge how the first day’s fighting perpetuated
the cowardly stereotype surrounding German-American troops, the Park Service is further
contributing to a narrative of Union moral purity and preventing visitors to come to terms with a
rather ugly undertone to life in the Union army.
The first “big question” one should ask themselves when visiting Cemetery Hill is how
the commemorative landscape ignores the cultural significance that the fighting on the first day
had on the German-Americans of the Eleventh Corps. Historian Christian Keller explains that
“the battle of Gettysburg and the Civil War as a whole enhanced Pennsylvania Germans’
conceptions of ethnic identity….German-Americans, especially, emerged from the conflict more
aware of their ethnicity and how they differed from the greater Anglo-American population.” 5 In
light of Keller’s insight into the significance that fighting at Gettysburg had on German5
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Americans, visitors must ask themselves why there are no monuments nor waysides
commemorating the sacrifices that thousands of German-Americans made for the Union cause.
The second question that visitors should ask themselves is how the preservation of a
serene and pastoral landscape around Cemetery Hill shifts visitors’ attention away from the
dehumanizing carnage that Civil War combat brought to the men who fought it. In his book
Interpreting Sacred Ground, historian Christian Spielvogel explains that maintaining a lush
natural landscape “creates a pastoral memory of the war that discourages reflection about the
intrusion of modernization and its effects on shattering ‘courage’s war’ as a masculine ideology
and military strategy.” 6 Using Spielvogel’s analysis as a guide, visitors should ask themselves
how the monuments at the site of the fighting impose a macro-history perspective on the
landscape by emphasizing strategic decisions by generals over the confused, chaotic terror that
individual soldiers were experiencing in the valley below.
There are several monuments on the Cemetery Hill landscape that do in fact honor the
soldiers who fought rather than the generals commanding from above. When viewing these
monuments, guests should analyze how the structures emphasize the the legitimization of
manliness and patriotism by glorifying virtuous suffering and displaying courage in the face of
dehumanizing combat. In his landmark work Embattled Courage, Gerald Linderman explains
that “the primacy of courage promised the soldier that no matter how immense the war, how
distant the fumbling the directing generals, or how powerful enemy forces seeking his
destruction, his fate would continue to rest on his inner qualities.” 7 Juxtaposing Linderman’s
analysis next to the portrayal of Union citizen soldiers on the monuments, guests must think
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about how a monuments’ depiction of Union soldiers fighting and dying in pursuit of duty,
courage, and manliness distracts visitors from understanding that Civil War combat was chaotic
and random, with no method or reason as to whom would be torn apart by enemy bullets in fields
of smoke.
There are several themes surrounding the Cemetery Hill landscape that should guide a
visitor’s interpretation of the area. The first theme centers around the disconnect between the
Northern public’s perception of why Union soldiers fought and died on the battlefield and the
actual reasons why many of German-Americans took up arms to defend the country that had
stigmatized them so frequently. This avoidance of the full truth of the Eleventh Corps’
experience both at Gettysburg and during the entire war is explained by post-war Northern
narratives that desired to portray the Union army as one that held a moral high ground over a
Southern slave oligarchy. 8 By claiming that all soldiers in the Union army were morally virtuous,
tolerant, and fought for the same reasons, the narrative ignores a narrative surrounding the
Eleventh Corps that makes the unit so unique. For many of the German-Americans who fought
and died in the fields around Cemetery Hill, their service was not an effort to preserve the Union,
but rather a cultural necessity to quell the negative stereotypes surrounding the German
population in America and legitimize their patriotism through sacrifice on the battlefield. 9
A second theme embodied within the commemorative landscape has to do with nativism,
and how Northern xenophobia towards German-Americans is reflected upon the landscape. More
specifically, an analysis of the various monuments on the landscape can help visitors understand
how specifically German-American prejudice was used to justify the failures of men like Francis
Barlow on the battlefield. By stereotyping German-American soldiers as cowardly and
8
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incompetent soldiers and using them as a scapegoat for the some of the strategic failures on the
first day, prejudiced Northerners such as Barlow could advance their own narratives of personal
fulfilment of duty and courage, using the cowardly reputation of the Eleventh Corps’ Germans to
shift blame away from his leadership and onto an entire culture of people.
A third broad theme related to the Cemetery Hill battlefield is the emphasis that the
National Park Service places on a macro-historical perspective. This perspective shifts a visitor's’
focus away from the chaotic hell that individual soldiers experienced on the battlefield, focussing
instead on the strategic decisions of horse-mounted generals who sat far from the fighting. This
again distracts visitors from the “savage” interpretation of battle that Christian Spielvogel
explains, focussing rather on a broader perspective that views units comprised of thousands of
individuals as one, homogeneous group who all experienced combat in the exact same way. 10
The first stop on the tour of Cemetery Hill is the Francis Barlow monument, located at
Barlow’s Knoll. The monument portrays Barlow as a dashing leader who stands unflappably
facing the advancing Confederates to the North. Left with only a large monument
commemorating a dashing commander, the Barlow monument leads visitors to believe that he
was an able and flawless general who bravely defended the knoll that became his namesake. At
the dedication of the monument in 1922, Colonel Lewis Stegman proudly asserted that “Barlow,
with characteristic vision, quickly realized that a knob in his front offered an invaluable salient
for his two brigades and with characteristic daring he did not hesitate in trying to seize it.” 11
Combined with the lush pastoral setting of the knoll, the site of the monument portrays Barlow
as a wise and strategic commander whose defeat on the first day of fighting could never be in
vain.
10

Spielvogel, 108.
The New York Monuments Commission, In Memoriam: Francis Channing Barlow, 1834-1896 (Albany: J.B.
Lyon Company, 1923), 29.
11

Klustner 10

While Barlow is immortalized as a man of duty and courage, the absence of any
acknowledgement to German-American troops around Barlow’s Knoll allows visitors to ignore
both the sacrifices that the Germans in Barlow’s division made on July 1st, nor the cultural
struggle that these Germans had to fight against their prejudiced commander. The
commemorative landscape fails to mention anywhere that Barlow used his German troops as an
excuse for the defeat at Barlow’s Knoll. In a post-war letter written to one of his classmates,
Barlow wrote that “these Dutch won’t fight. Their officers say so and they say so themselves and
they ruin all with whom they come in contact.” 12 The commemorative landscape around the
Barlow monument makes no mention regarding Barlow’s prejudiced comments about GermanAmericans, nor admits that his decision to advance forward onto the knoll likely spurred the
collapse of the Union position. By refusing to discuss the tension between Barlow and his troops,
the National Park Service is ensuring that Barlow is remembered the same way as every other
Union soldier would be: as an honorable and morally sound citizen soldier, who made great
sacrifices for the sake of freedom and equality.
The landscape around Barlow’s Knoll fails to mention its role as a setting where GermanAmerican troops sought to legitimize their status as Americans in the face of an outspoken and
prejudiced commander. Christian Keller explains that “immigrants recognized that participation
in the war was their route to full recognition as American citizens.” 13 As a result, Barlow’s Knoll
would be a key location where hundreds of Germans would take up arms and fight in
horrendous, dehumanizing combat in order to prove their worth as Americans to prejudiced men
like Barlow. By maintaining only one historical narrative at the site, that of Barlow courageously
commanding his troops in battle, the visitor will never realize that Barlow’s Knoll was a setting
12
13

Francis Barlow, letter to Robert Treat Paine, August 12th, 1863.
Keller, 21.

Klustner 11

in which German-Americans were tasked with fighting their own separate war: that against their
own Union comrades who labeled them as cowards.
The decision to exclude the German-American narrative from Barlow’s Knoll can be
attributed to the postwar North’s efforts to materialize the memory of the Union war effort into a
single cohesive narrative: that of valiant citizen soldiers who took up arms to fight for equality
and reunion. 14 Thus, shedding light on the fierce stigma that many German-American troops
faced during the war would prove the Union army to be a hypocritical mass of xenophobes who
were forcing their comrades to legitimize themselves through bloodshed. In order to keep the
morally straight, citizen-soldier narrative intact, commemoration efforts established a collective
memory about the identity of the Union soldier, thus ignoring the prejudice that GermanAmericans faced from their own comrades.
The second stop on the tour brings the visitor to the 74th Pennsylvania monument. The
monument features a Union soldier who appears to be wounded. He is laying on the ground, with
an American flag draped over his shoulder and a wreath, a symbol frequently associated with
victory, at his side. The intent of the monument is to portray a typical Union citizen soldier who
has been wounded in battle in an attempt to defend his country and achieve victory, the symbols
for which are kept closely at his side.
The 74th Pennsylvania monument is a commemorative tool that celebrates citizen
soldiers of the Union dying the “Good Death” that Victorian America placed so much
importance upon. 15 The 74th Pennsylvania monument portrays Union soldiers as ordinary
citizens, whose love for their country and desire for victory drove them to make the ultimate
sacrifice in battle. Additionally, by including the symbols of the wreath and American flag in the
14
15
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monument, visitors are deceived in believing that the main goal of combat in the Civil War was
to achieve glory or strategic gain, when in reality war’s goal is always to simply kill as many of
the enemy as you can. Christian Spielvogel explains that monuments such as that of the 74th
Pennsylvania are used to “deemphasize the centrality of war’s killing and injuring,” and thus
shift the visitor’s focus away from the “savage” interpretation of war and instead celebrate these
soldier’s fulfilment of courage and honor. 16 What the monument of the 74th Pennsylvania
doesn’t explain is how the unit was one of the few all-German regiments in the Union army.
Thus, similar to the Barlow’s Knoll site, visitors are deceived into believing that the men in the
74th Pennsylvania were dying out of love for their country and not in an attempt to prove their
worth as Americans.
The base of Cemetery Hill is the third stop on the tour. Originally the site of amazing
bloodshed and confused retreat, the base of the hill today is a serene and pastoral landscape,
featuring much of the same terrain that the men of the Eleventh Corps fought on. In preserving
the base of the hill as a pleasant and natural setting, the Park Service is succeeding in evoking a
feeling among visitors that “effaces war’s savagery and uses nature to protect and promote a
heroic interpretation of war as part of the natural order.” 17 Regimental memoirs written after the
war prove that the fighting at the base of Cemetery Hill was far from being simply “natural
order”. Private Reuben Ruch of the 153rd New York described the scene of the fighting’s brutal
aftermath, claiming that bodies “were piled up in every shape, some on their backs, some on
their faces, and other turned and twisted in every imaginable shape.” 18

16

Spielvogel, 104-5.
Ibid, 113.
18
William R, Kiefer, History of the One Hundred Fifty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry (Easton,
Pa, 1909), 214.
17

Klustner 13

In preserving the pastoral nature of the base of Cemetery Hill, the National Park Service
is succeeding in creating what Spielvogel describes as a “pastoral memory of the war that
discourages reflection about the intrusion of modernization and its effects on shattering
‘courage’s war’ as a masculine ideology and military strategy.” 19 Thus, the National Park
Service is distracting visitors from coming to the realization that the Civil War was a modern,
brutal war; one that pitted man against machine. There are no waysides in the area to help
visitors come to grips with the bloodshed that occurred in the valley in front of them. Instead,
visitors are left to picture what the battle may have looked at in their own way. Consequently, the
base of Cemetery Hill encourages visitors to ignore what modern technology had done to the
men of the Eleventh Corps on July 1st, allowing guests to remain under the impression that the
men in the valley in front of them had died virtuously and peacefully, rather than torn to shreds
by musket and cannon ball.
The final stop on the Cemetery Hill tour is the summit of the hill itself, where a massive
statue of General Oliver Howard overlooks the valley below. At the summit, there are only two
waysides which just briefly describe some of the fighting on the hill on July 2nd and 3rd, with no
mention made to the carnage on the 1st. Similar to the pastoral interpretation of the landscape
which was fostered at the base of the hill, the vast expanse of the valley below further
depersonalizes the experiences of individual soldiers, instead clumping groups of thousands of
men into regiments, brigades and divisions. Spielvogel says that this method of landscaping
succeeds in “directing the visitor’s gaze outward over long stretches of the battlefield in order to
understand broader battle strategy and outcome.” 20 The summit of Cemetery Hill is an attractive
location for visitors to come to, since its serene views and absence of any Confederate
19
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monuments allow the visitor observe the battlefield in nostalgic peace, rather than pulling their
attention towards the realities of bloodshed, retreat, and xenophobic stigma that all interplayed
within the valley below. The broad projection of the valley that allows visitors to visualize Union
soldiers as massive units rather than individuals further rejects the depersonalizing horrors of
combat, and convincing visitors that the ultimate goal of the combat in the valley was something
more than simply killing as many of the enemy as possible.
Historical narratives are never simple stories to tell, and the many layers of historical
narration that reveal, or shield themselves, throughout the Cemetery Hill landscape are an
excellent reflection of this. It is an unreasonable opinion to think that the National Park Service
should have to tell every possible narrative at every possible location on the battlefield. It is
reasonable, however, to task visitors to the battlefield with thinking about why certain details of
the battle are included while others are ignored. By asking the “big questions” regarding the
events that transpired at Gettysburg, visitors to the battlefield learn to never take any
commemorative landscape at the field at face value. If guests can learn anything about the nature
of a commemorative landscape, it should be that every monument, wayside, and marker is
located where it is, and says what it says, for a reason. Asking the bigger questions about the
battle while visiting a commemorative landscape can allow guests to better understand the
political and cultural factors that influence the memorialization and content of a place like
Gettysburg National Military Park.
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